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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 12-3237
______
STEPHEN P. KOONS
Appellant
v.
XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC.;
GREENWICH INSURANCE CO.
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-02956)
District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 19, 2013

Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 25, 2013)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Stephen P. Koons (“Koons”) filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that
XL Insurance America, Inc. (“XL Insurance”) and Greenwich Insurance Company

(“Greenwich”) had a duty to defend and indemnify him in a personal injury action filed
against him. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District
Court denied Koons‟ motion and granted XL Insurance‟s and Greenwich‟s motions. On
appeal, Koons only challenges the District Court‟s decision to grant Greenwich‟s motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse and remand the
matter.
I.
This action arises out of a tragic incident occurring on April 18, 2008, in which
Jeremy J. Andre, an employee of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC, was killed while operating a
garbage disposal truck.1 Andre‟s Estate filed an action alleging, inter alia, that Koons
had caused the death because he owned the truck which killed Andre and had failed to
properly maintain it. Disposition of the instant matter hinges on the relationship between
Koons, Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC (and its predecessors), and the truck which allegedly
killed Andre.
A. Factual Background
In 1999, Koons purchased Miller Concrete and ran it as a sole proprietorship.
Miller Concrete‟s business was selling and installing underground tanks. While he
owned and ran Miller Concrete, Koons was also the sole shareholder and President of No
Fun Allowed, Inc. (“NFA”) d/b/a Ches-Mont Disposal. Ches-Mont Disposal is a waste
collection, recycling, and disposal company. Therefore, Koons owned the tank
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In the record, the company is alternatively referred to as “Chesmont Disposal,” but for
consistency‟s sake, we will use the hyphenated version of the name.
2

installment company as a sole proprietorship (Miller Concrete) and simultaneously was
the President and sole shareholder of the waste collection and disposal corporation (NFA
d/b/a Ches-Mont Disposal).
On October 22, 2001, Stephen Koons d/b/a Miller Concrete purchased Mack
Truck Model No. MR688S, VIN 1M2K195C71M018188 (“the Truck”) from McNeilus
Truck and Manufacturing Company for $136,000. (Appendix (“App.”) at 411). This is
the Truck that allegedly caused the death of Jeremy Andre. McNeilus‟ invoice
documenting the sale lists Ches-Mont Disposal as the Final User of the Truck. (Id. at
411). The Truck is a trash disposal truck, specially fitted with a twenty-five-yard high
compaction rear loader.
The Truck was delivered on November 7, 2001. On November 12, 2001, Koons
entered into a lease agreement with NFA, in which Koons agreed to lease the Truck to
NFA for thirty-six months, at a rate of $2,657.41 per month. Koons asserts NFA never
actually made lease payments to him, since he was the sole owner of NFA. The record
contains no evidence, such as cancelled checks or other documents, that NFA made any
payments. Although the lease expired in November 2004, as of October 6, 2009, the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PENNDOT”) listed Stephen Koons d/b/a
Miller Concrete as the owner of the Truck, and NFA d/b/a Ches-Mont Disposal as the
lessee. (App. at 438).
After the lease expired in November 2004, Ches-Mont Disposal continued to make
exclusive, uninterrupted use of the Truck. Koons did not perform any maintenance on
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the Truck; it was exclusively inspected, maintained, and repaired by employees of ChesMont Disposal.
In 2006, Koons acquired two partners, Richard Godshell and Patrick Kelly.2 The
three formed Ches-Mont Holdings, LLC (“the Holding Company”); Koons holds a 35%
share of the Holding Company, with Godshell and Kelly owning the rest. At the same
time, Ches-Mont Disposal, Inc. changed from an S-Corporation to a limited liability
corporation, and became Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC. The Holding Company was the sole
owner of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC, and Koons was President of the disposal company.
Therefore, at the end of the corporate restructuring, Ches-Mont Disposal was wholly
owned by the Holding Company, and Koons owned 35% of the Holding Company and
was President of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC.3 After this restructuring, Ches-Mont
Disposal continued to make exclusive and uninterrupted use of the Truck, even though
the lease had long expired, and Koons continued to not receive any compensation for his
provision of the Truck.
B. Procedural History
Andre‟s Estate sued Koons, along with other defendants not relevant to this case,
as the owner of the Truck, alleging that he failed to properly inspect, maintain, and/or
repair the Truck, which contributed to Andre‟s death. Andre‟s Estate did not sue either
Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC or Ches-Mont Holdings, and does not allege Koons is liable
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In 2004 or 2005, NFA changed its name to Ches-Mont Disposal, Inc., but did not
otherwise change its structure.
3

This was the corporate structure in place at the time of Andre‟s death.
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because of his relationship to either of those companies. Koons‟ alleged liability is
premised solely on his ownership of the Truck.
Koons sought defense and indemnification from XL Insurance and Greenwich,
which they refused to pay. He then filed the instant action seeking declaratory judgment
that both companies had a duty to defend and indemnify him. After all the parties filed
motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted the motions of XL Insurance
and Greenwich against Koons. Koons appeals only from the District Court‟s decision
that Koons is not an “Insured” under “Coverage B” of the Greenwich policy.
Under the Greenwich policy, Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC, is the Named Insured.
Coverage extends to the “Insured,” defined as:
1. The Named Insured
…
3. your [the Named Insured‟s] partners, joint venture members,
executive officers, employees, directors, stockholders or volunteers
while acting within the scope of their duties as such.
(App. at 237) (emphasis added). The District Court found that Koons was not an
“Insured” under the policy. The court concluded that, based on the record, no reasonable
jury could find that Koons had purchased the Truck in his role as owner of the
predecessor of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC, and therefore he was not being sued for
conduct committed “while acting within the scope of [his] duties.” The District Court
denied Koons‟ motion to alter or amend judgment, and Koons timely appealed.

II.
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a grant of
summary judgment, applying the same standard as the District Court. Dee v. Borough of
Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Material facts are those that could affect the
outcome of the proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence
is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw
all reasonable inferences in that party‟s favor.” Id. at 373-74.

A. Interpretation of the Contract
Koons argues that the District Court erred because it failed to consider the purpose
of umbrella insurance policies, as well as the reasonable expectations of the parties, and
that under such considerations, the contract should be broadly construed in his favor.
This argument fails.
Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree governs here, “the interpretation
of the scope of coverage of an insurance contract is a question of law properly decided by
the court, a question over which we exercise plenary review.” Med. Protective Co. v.
Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999). If “„the language of the [insurance] contract
is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.‟” Madison
6

Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Gene &
Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 910, 913 (1986)). “„Where a
provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer, the dafter of the agreement.‟” Id. “This is not a question
to be resolved in a vacuum. Rather, contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.” Id.
The contract language is clear. “Insured” is defined as the “partners, joint venture
members, executive officers, employees, directors, stockholders or volunteers” of the
Named Insured, “while acting within the scope of their duties as such.” (App. at 237).
This unambiguously indicates that the relevant individuals are not covered for all of their
conduct, but rather only the conduct they commit “while acting within the scope of their
duties” as employees or owners of Ches-Mont Disposal. Since this language is
unambiguous, it controls, and we need not address Koons‟ policy-based arguments, the
reasonable expectations of the parties, or Greenwich‟s claim that Koons has waived this
line of argument. Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106.
B. Genuine Dispute as to a Material Fact4
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We do not address whether the contract language unambiguously indicates that Koons‟
conduct, as the sole shareholder and President of the predecessor to the Named Insured,
would be covered by the contract. As explained above, assessing contract language for
ambiguity is a fact-based analysis, dependent on the specific circumstances of the case.
Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106. The District Court did not decide this issue,
instead finding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to find
that Koons had provided the Truck to Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC in his capacity as the
owner of the predecessor of Ches-Mont Disposal. Since the District Court and the parties
7

The Andre Estate alleged Koons was liable because he owned the Truck and failed
to properly maintain it. Greenwich argues that Koons‟ alleged liability is not related to
his duties as part-owner and President of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC or his ownership of
its predecessor. Koons argued, and argues on appeal, that he acted within his role as an
owner when he provided the Truck to Ches-Mont Disposal. The District Court found that
there is “no evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find that [Koons]
purchased and leased the truck in his capacity as the founder and sole owner of the
predecessor of Ches-Mont LLC,” and based its holding on that ground. The District
Court erred.
In an insurance coverage dispute, “an insured bears the initial burden to make a
prima facie showing that a claim falls within the policy‟s grant of coverage.” State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2009). For summary
judgment to be denied, the record need not contain direct evidence to create a genuine
issue as to a material fact; circumstantial evidence which would allow a jury to find for
the nonmovant is sufficient.5 See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155,
1165 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[N]othing in Rule 56 prevents [plaintiffs] from creating a genuine
issue of material fact by pointing to sufficiently powerful countervailing circumstantial
evidence.”).
did not address the issue, and since resolution of the issue is fact-dependent, it would be
inappropriate for us to decide it here.
5
This is particularly true when disposition of an issue turns on the individual‟s state of
mind, and the record contains circumstantial evidence of that state of mind.
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 130 (3d Cir. 1998). Though this
case does not directly turn on Koons‟ state of mind, it does implicate his purpose or
motivation in purchasing the Truck.
8

Here, the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record, viewing the
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Koons, that
Koons purchased the Truck in his capacity as the founder and sole owner of the
predecessor of Ches-Mont LLC. We conclude that there is.
The Truck is specially designed for waste disposal purposes; it is a trash truck.
The Truck was purchased by Koons d/b/a Miller Concrete, even though Miller Concrete
sold and installed septic tanks. At the time of purchase, Koons was also the sole owner
of Ches-Mont Disposal, a waste disposal company. The fact that Koons purchased a
specially designed trash disposal truck, and at the time owned both a septic tank company
and a trash disposal company, would allow a reasonable jury to infer that he purchased
the trash disposal truck “in his capacity as the founder and sole owner” of the trash
disposal company, rather than for the benefit of the tank installment company.
This conclusion is supported by other evidence in the record. Koons purchased
the Truck for $136,000 on October 22, 2001, and it was delivered on November 7, 2001.
Almost immediately after delivery, Koons began to “lease” the Truck to NFA, the
predecessor to Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC. Though NFA d/b/a Ches-Mont Disposal was
supposed to pay Koons $2657.41 per month, Koons testified that no payments were ever
made to him, and there is no evidence of any payments in the record.6 Additionally, the
lease expired in November 2004, but NFA and its successors continued to make
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Koons testified that because “[he] was the company [Ches-Mont Disposal],” he was
“giving the Truck to [himself],” without compensation. (App. at 408).
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exclusive, uninterrupted use of the Truck after the end of the lease period; Koons never
used the Truck for his personal benefit or for the benefit of Miller Concrete.
Furthermore, the Truck vendor‟s invoice, which documented the purchase of the
Truck, identified Koons as the buyer of the Truck but listed Ches-Mont Disposal as its
Final User. Although this document was created over two weeks before Koons leased the
Truck to NFA, it already noted that Ches-Mont Disposal was the intended Final User of
the vehicle.
In sum, the record establishes that Koons purchased a $136,000 trash disposal
truck, almost immediately provided it to his trash disposal company, received no
financial compensation for it, did not personally use it, and did not allow Miller Concrete
to use it. The record shows that the trash company maintained and used the Truck
exclusively and without interruption after receiving it from Koons, continued to do so
after the lease period expired, and did not pay Koons anything for the use of the Truck,
either during or after the lease period. This provides sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable jury to infer Koons purchased the Truck in his capacity as the owner of ChesMont LLC‟s predecessor. To conclude otherwise, we would have to hold that every
reasonable jury would find that Koons had purchased the $136,000 trash disposal truck
and provided it to the trash disposal company that he owned, without compensation, for
reasons other than his ownership of the company. We are unwilling to do so.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court‟s Order is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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